Scientific
Pluralism (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy
of Science
by Stephen
H. Kellert, Helen E. Longino, and C. Kenneth
Waters, Editors
University Of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis,
MN, 2006
272 pp. Illus. 1 b/w. Trade, $50
ISBN: 0-8166-4763-1.
Amy Ione
1312 Curtin St
State College PA 16803
ione@diatrope.com
Scientific Pluralism, edited by
Stephen H. Kellert, Helen E. Longino,
and C. Kenneth Waters, tackles a topic
now at the forefront of studies in the
history and philosophy of science. Drawing
upon the research of 10 leading scholars,
the essays largely answer yes to the books
primary question: Can pluralism be advanced
as a general interpretation of science?
In coming to this conclusion, the contributors
demonstrate that they support the idea
that the world is too complicated (or
too indeterminate) and our cognitive interests
are too diverse to validate the monist
ideas that predominated in scientific
discussions historically. As the editors
tell us, it is because the scientific
enterprise is itself a complicated phenomenon
that no single disciplinary approach can
provide a fully adequate account of its
conceptual phenomena. Thus, in their view,
only a pluralistic approach can provide
a comprehensive explanation of its conceptual,
technical, cognitive, psychological, social,
historical, and normative aspects.
Overall, Scientific Pluralism firmly
grapples with why it is unreasonable
to aim to achieve a single all-encompassing
conclusion adopting an epistemological
thesis. Essays provide case studies generally
advancing local rather than universal
schemata. As a whole, the case studies
reject a priori commitments to
either unity or multiplicity, allowing
the scientific evidence to decide the
particulars. The willingness of the contributors
to suggest there are serious limits for
metaphysical conclusions from science,
even within the pluralism approach, is
a strong point of the book. Equally impressive
is the way the pluralists observe that
scientists present varioussometimes
even incompatiblemodels of the world.
In addition, the book benefits from the
historical context offered in the introduction
and several of the essays. Key players
in the move toward pluralism (e.g.
Patrick Suppes and Nancy Cartwright) are
introduced and credited for opening evaluation
within the history and philosophy of science
field. The varied historical references
also encourage the reader to appreciate
the need for (and value of) interdisciplinary
approaches within science studies.
Given that Scientific Pluralism
effectively demonstrates the viability
of the view that some phenomena require
multiple accounts, it is perhaps ironic
that this volume fails to include any
voices critical of the pluralistic thesis.
The authors address the view that some
think that pluralism could arise from
slicing the same unitary but complex pie
through different axis, but there is no
essay in the volume that promotes a unitary
framework over the pluralistic vantage
point. This skews the arguments somewhat
since no thinkers express why some continue
to favor and pursue unification models.
Albert Einsteins legendary commitment
to unity was demonstrated by his refusal
to accept quantum inconsistencies. His
bedevilment with the situation, as he
held fast in his search for a Unified
Field Theory, is a primary part of his
biography. In this case, Einstein aspired
to describe all fundamental forces and
the relationships between elementary particles
in terms of a single theoretical framework,
one in which electromagnetism and gravity
would emerge as different aspects of a
single fundamental field. Although he
never accomplished this feat, the search
continues. Contemporary thinkers such
as Stephen Hawking continue to hold to
a unitary ideal as they search for a Theory
of Everything. Indeed, to some it is hard
to argue that there is not an underlying
reality governing all phenomena, especially
when the laws of physics operate over
60 orders of magnitude, only (supposedly)
breaking down at the Planck scale.
What the book does make clear is that
the monistic assumption holds that all
different accounts can be reconciled into
a single, unified explanation or that
there is a single perspicuous representation
system within which all correct accounts
can be expressed. The authors represented
in Scientific Pluralism convey
that this type of position is philosophically
related to fundamentalism, (which holds
there is one lawor very few lawsfrom
which all correct accounts can be derived)
and challenge its underlying assumptions
naturalistically as well. The volume also
demonstrates that the pluralistic stance,
by contrast, rejects both monism and fundamentalism,
including the metaphysical solutions that
are often proposed to fill the gaps.
When seeing this kind of collection, critics
of scientific pluralism are apt to ask
if pluralism is a way to avoid answering
difficult questions. The essayists in
this volume do respond to the conundrum
of several views by addressing the task
of identifying which situations require
multiple approaches as an empirical question.
As the editors explain in their introduction,
the pluralists respond to the unity/plurality
dilemma within science studies by asking
whether the kind of scientific inquiry
that leads to monism should itself be
treated as an empirical question. Given
that it is one the pluralists postulate
we cannot answer, it is hardly surprising
that the theorists holds that there is
no definitive argument for monism and,
therefore, it seems unreasonable that
the ultimate aim of science is to achieve
a single, comprehensive account. With
this assumption guiding the analyses,
the authors do achieve the volumes
goal in explaining that pluralism provides
a means of avoiding senseless controversies
and helps emphasize the particularity
of scientific knowledge.
Themes range from the behavioral and biological
to physical and mathematical sciences.
Thus, in essence, the book is pluralistic
both on its own terms and argumentatively
as well. Alan W. Richardsons essay,
"The Many Unities of Science: Politics,
Semantics, and Ontology," provides an
examination of the history of unity/disunity
themes, demonstrating that there is greater
flexibility in the older ideas than was
appreciated in the mid-to-late twentieth
century philosophies of science. As he
shows, pluralistic attitudes enable us
to see deeper connections with social
and political concerns than advocacy of
a single approach does. Drawing on the
findings of perceptual psychology, Ronald
Giere offers a general empirical argument
for pluralism using perception and color
vision as a metaphor. He argues there
is no way to say which perspective is
correct, although one perspective might
be deemed richer than another in certain
respects. Michael Dickson argues that
mathematical constraints of quantum theory
are insufficient in a way that makes it
difficult to pick out one of several dynamics.
Carla Fehr examines the scientific literature
on the evolution of sex and identifies
a number of different explanations, none
of them completely satisfying, in her
view. Fehr also points out that these
explanations are typically viewed as opposing
one another. Geoffrey Hellman and John
Bell, C. Wade Savage, and Esther-Mirjam
Sent also make solid contributions.
In essence, Scientific Pluralism
makes a well-rounded case for a pluralist
approach philosophically with the authors
adeptly explaining how this stance integrates
with concerns about metaphysics and metascience.
Although the book does not, in my view,
adequately address the circularity some
see within the pluralistic arguments since
no "outsiders" speak, it does point out
that the basic task of metascience is
to work with certain aggregate of facts,
asking: How can one construct a theory
that describes these facts effectively
and makes correct predictions? This task,
unlike the more commonly adopted metaphysical
alternative to anomalies within traditional
scientific narratives, makes us aware
that scientific inquiry typically represents
some aspects of the world well, at the
cost of obscuring, or perhaps even distorting,
other aspects. Finally, although I agree
with this volumes pluralistic agenda,
I wished the book had included one or
two critical voices, as explained above.
Without analytical entries from opponents
of the pluralistic view, the arguments
seemed to exist in a vacuum. Even with
this disclaimer, I would recommend this
book. It is a clear, comprehensive, and
informative contribution to studies in
the history and philosophy of science.