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Reinventing Pragmatism: American Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century

by Joseph Margolis
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2002.
179 pp. $ 39.95 ISBN: 0-8014-3995-7.

Reviewed by Ian Verstegen
Art History, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122

iversteg@temple.edu

Pragmatism - the loosely defined philosophical commitment to the practical and here-and-now that emerged in the early twentieth century in America — has seemed an apt compromise today between arid scientific realism and extreme relativism. The term took on a new urgency when it has been adopted by two very different and battling philosophers, Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty. Whoever is right to claim the title, the winner guarantees pragmatism's success, because both claim its legacy. Pragmatism has always been popular in art education circles due to the influence of John Dewey. Joseph Margolis's Reinventing Pragmatism is an excellent vehicle for debating the very 'pragmatism' that appears to be so attractive today.

This book is part raucous account of Putnams's and Rorty's philosophical battles over the past twenty years (as Margolis speaks as a participant who has published alongside these thinkers for nearly fifty years), part assessment of contemporary philosophy (since the issues of naturalism vs. non-reductive pragmatism animate all debates) and part personal solution, as Margolis spies the unexpected turns of some pretty acrimonious debate, and offers many corrections.

Margolis' first point is that the pragmatisms espoused by Putnam and Rorty have little to do with the theories of Peirce, James and Dewey, in spite of their authors' claims. For that matter, there are sticky compatibilities between these founders, who were split on a number of issues. In spite of that Margolis charges especially Rorty with a gross misreading of Dewey. While both claim an identity as pragmatists, Putnam takes the non-reductive side of pragmatism, while Rorty melds reductivism with a pragmatist postmodernism. While Margolis' sympathies are more toward relativism and, therefore, at least superficially Rorty, Margolis stands closer to Putnam against Rorty's outrageous claims to a final post-philosophy.

Putnam has, for the past twenty years, famously retreated from a scientific realism toward an internal realism and now pragmatism. Rorty, on the other hand, has strangely maintained scientific realist beliefs (touting his affinities with analyticians like Quine, Davidson and Dennett) but combined them with a pragmatic dismissal of foundational philosophical questions. For Margolis, Putnam's attempts to eradicate Cartesian dualism are too weak and sometimes unnecessary, while Rorty is guilty of simply re-labeling theorists as pragmatists in the cause and hoping that a rhetorical snap of dismissal will quiet philosophical debate. More radical, Margolis claims, is to reconsider more precisely the original proposals of Dewey. His Darwinized version of Hegel placed knowledge at an intermediate situation of practical, lived experience with the need to understand. According to Margolis, this reframing of the situation wipes out the very Cartesianism that Putnam and Rorty have been wrangling with. Whatever we think of Margolis’ proposal, it will lead us back to the texts and challenge our easy acceptance of the terms of the debates.

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