Reinventing Pragmatism: American Philosophy
at the End of the Twentieth Century
by Joseph Margolis
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2002.
179 pp. $ 39.95 ISBN: 0-8014-3995-7.
Reviewed by Ian Verstegen
Art History, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122
iversteg@temple.edu
Pragmatism - the loosely defined philosophical commitment to the practical
and here-and-now that emerged in the early twentieth century in America
has seemed an apt compromise today between arid scientific realism
and extreme relativism. The term took on a new urgency when it has been
adopted by two very different and battling philosophers, Hilary Putnam
and Richard Rorty. Whoever is right to claim the title, the winner guarantees
pragmatism's success, because both claim its legacy. Pragmatism has
always been popular in art education circles due to the influence of
John Dewey. Joseph Margolis's Reinventing Pragmatism is an excellent
vehicle for debating the very 'pragmatism' that appears to be so attractive
today.
This book is part raucous account of Putnams's and Rorty's philosophical
battles over the past twenty years (as Margolis speaks as a participant
who has published alongside these thinkers for nearly fifty years),
part assessment of contemporary philosophy (since the issues of naturalism
vs. non-reductive pragmatism animate all debates) and part personal
solution, as Margolis spies the unexpected turns of some pretty acrimonious
debate, and offers many corrections.
Margolis' first point is that the pragmatisms espoused by Putnam and
Rorty have little to do with the theories of Peirce, James and Dewey,
in spite of their authors' claims. For that matter, there are sticky
compatibilities between these founders, who were split on a number of
issues. In spite of that Margolis charges especially Rorty with a gross
misreading of Dewey. While both claim an identity as pragmatists, Putnam
takes the non-reductive side of pragmatism, while Rorty melds reductivism
with a pragmatist postmodernism. While Margolis' sympathies are more
toward relativism and, therefore, at least superficially Rorty, Margolis
stands closer to Putnam against Rorty's outrageous claims to a final
post-philosophy.
Putnam has, for the past twenty years, famously retreated from a scientific
realism toward an internal realism and now pragmatism. Rorty, on the
other hand, has strangely maintained scientific realist beliefs (touting
his affinities with analyticians like Quine, Davidson and Dennett) but
combined them with a pragmatic dismissal of foundational philosophical
questions. For Margolis, Putnam's attempts to eradicate Cartesian dualism
are too weak and sometimes unnecessary, while Rorty is guilty of simply
re-labeling theorists as pragmatists in the cause and hoping that a
rhetorical snap of dismissal will quiet philosophical debate. More radical,
Margolis claims, is to reconsider more precisely the original proposals
of Dewey. His Darwinized version of Hegel placed knowledge at an intermediate
situation of practical, lived experience with the need to understand.
According to Margolis, this reframing of the situation wipes out the
very Cartesianism that Putnam and Rorty have been wrangling with. Whatever
we think of Margolis proposal, it will lead us back to the texts
and challenge our easy acceptance of the terms of the debates.