ORDER/SUBSCRIBE          SPONSORS          CONTACT          WHAT'S NEW          INDEX/SEARCH

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Reviewer biography

Current Reviews

Review Articles

Book Reviews Archive

Satisficing Games and Decision Making: With Applications to Engineering and Computer Science

by Wynn C. Stirling
Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003
268 pp., illus. 20 b/w. Trade, $ 80.00
ISBN: 0-521-81724-2.

Reviewed by John Knight
User-Lab, Birmingham Institute of Art and Design

John.knight@uce.ac.uk

Wynn C. Stirling is professor of electrical engineering at Brigham Young University. The book outlines an alternative approach to decision making that aims to integrate "the way humans make decisions into machines [in order to solve] subtle situations where group and self interest conflict".

The book has nine sections that take the reader from Rationality, through Locality, Praxeology, Equanimity, Uncertainty, Community, Congruency, Complexity and Meliority. There is a useful appendix with introductory texts to some of the background theory. It should be of interest to "engineers, computer scientists and mathematicians working in artificial intelligence and expert systems". It is not an easy read but is rewarding to anyone with an interest in how people and machines make decisions. Chapters follow a consistent format starting with background theory with algebraic proofs, then a description of Stirling’s approach that ends with examples of decision-making in games.

Stirling suggests that human decision making is often based on what is "good enough" rather than what is "optimal". Starting with Maupertuis’ "principle of least action" (p. 1), the author describes definitions of the optimal and notes how context and complexity make it a difficult notion to sustain. He concludes that "good enough" is an intelligent response to meeting diverse needs given the intractable nature of complex problems. While based on game theory, he is concerned with bias and that it "is built of one basic principle: individual self interest" (p. 19).

The first chapter deals with models of rationality. The author outlines "the concept of preference ordering" that orders options by reflexivity, antisymmetry, transitivity, and linearity. Choice is underpinned by "substantive rationality" that assumes the decision-maker is in possession of all the options and that they make an impartial and informed choice. Alternatively "procedural rationality" focuses on the quality of the decision-making process and the rules that are employed in it. He notes, however, that heuristics mean that the "solution cannot be considered in anyway optimal" (p. 8). A third approach is described as "bounded rationality" that "involves the exigencies of practical decision-making and takes into consideration . . . the constraints that exist in real-world situations" (p. 10). This idea introduces Herbert Simon’s notion of satisficing that aims to meet expectations rather that "optimization". The author seeks a middle ground between the "hyperrational" and the ad hoc and offers two "desirable attributes" of adequacy, (knowing the decision is an optimal compromise) and sociality that it accommodates others’ needs. The chapter concludes by looking at a number of ways of accommodating group needs including the "Pareto equilibrium". These attributes are meant to provide a "general relaxing of substantive rationality . . . while maintaining the integrity of inherent principles . . . [and bringing] rigour to procedural logic" (p 11).

The third chapter deals with the "science of efficient action" (Praxeology) and concerns "practical activity and human conduct" (p. 60). The chapter looks at trade-offs, errors, and abduction on the basis that "satisficing requires the formation of dichotomous trade-offs" (p. 82). Equanimity is discussed in the following chapter, concluding that satisficing "should conform to fairness" (p. 73) based on the availability of resources, certainty (that the decision is good enough) and that it does not "foreclose optimality". Adequacy and consistency are introduced given that "people may be motivated by aspirations that are higher than their ability" (p. 81) and "that it is essential . . . that due care be given to the relative weighting" of options (p. 82).

Chapter Five investigates uncertainty and quotes Pliny the Elder, "The only certainty is uncertainty" (p. 89). A number of uncertainty domains are described including bluffing, the prisoners’ dilemma, and the impact of other decision makers’ power. The book then returns to group decision-making and quotes Margolis, "A decision-maker in a group will possess a social utility and a private utility" (p. 140). This strategy leads on to a discussion of congruency that deals with agreement seeking, negotiation, and compromise and touches on ethics and "social welfare" (p. 161). The penultimate chapter introduces complexity suggesting that "[o]ne who suffers from uncertainty is frustrated by a lack of knowledge; one who suffers from complexity is frustrated by a lack of know-how" (p.169).The final chapter looks at meliority arguing that "the trouble is, that humans are quite capable of operating with a double standard, it is not clear how to endow an artificial decision-making entity with such an ability" (p. 205). Stirling has written a fascinating book on a uniquely human subject: How do we (and machines) do the right thing. The book is not aimed at popularising the subject but is worth the investment.

 

 




Updated 1st December 2004


Contact LDR: ldr@leonardo.org

Contact Leonardo: isast@leonardo.info


copyright © 2004 ISAST