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Realism & Antirealism

Edited by William P. Alston
Cornell University Press, New York, 2002
300 pp.
ISBN: 0-8014-4028-9 (Paper)

Reviewed by Robert Pepperell
Polar (Posthuman Laboratory for Arts Research)


pepperell@ntlword.com

Realism & Antirealism
is a collection of essays that address, from a number of standpoints, whether a mind-independent world exists or not. In essence this is the perennial idealism vs. materialism debate couched in contemporary terminology, in which the realist holds that there is a physical world that exists whether we are here to perceive it while the antirealist holds that the precondition for existence of the world is our mental construction of it. The various shades of the debate are rendered in the clear introductory essay by William Alston, where the historical context is briefly set out and the various positions summarised.

In the opening essay, 'Realism, Antirealism, and Common Sense', Caleb Miller appeals to the inherent rationality of the common sense view that objects exist and have qualities independently of our perceptions. Thus: ". . .common sense makes it more rational, all things considered, to believe that realism is true than to believe its denial, antirealism." (p. 23).Mark S. McLeod offers the more interesting suggestion in 'Realism and Irrealism' that given the compelling nature of both sides of the argument realism and antirealism might be equally valid; in other words, despite the inherent contradiction both states could be true. Using the form of a Platonic dialogue between an imaginary realist and what McLeod terms an 'irrealist', the possibility of there being a case for valid contradictions is considered. But since this is ruled out ("there is no pair of contradictory statements both of which we must admit is true." (p. 29)) the interim solution is to posit two worlds, one in which the realist position holds and one in which the antirealist position holds - leading to McLoed's coining of the term irrealism. Yet the two-worlds scenario seems unnecessary when one considers the possible cases where contradictory statements can be true, especially in instances of ambiguity and indeterminacy where opposing or inconclusive states co-exist. For it is equally true to say the Necker cube is oriented along one axis as it is along another axis, just as it is equally true to say the observed light in the Double-Slit Experiment behaves as in one sense as particles and in another sense as waves. Neither of these conditions negates an objective stance towards the world.

Constrained by the non-contradictory principle of Aristotelianlogic (the abandonment of which, it is claimed, would lead to relativistic confusion) McLeod resorts to the invocation of God and mystical revelation to reconcile the difficulties prompted by the two-worlds scenario. With one move the metaphysical problems are passed to an external and unaccountable agent. The error here is not so much this buck passing than the supposition that the law of non-contradiction is somehow in itself "metaphysically neutral vis-Ì-vis realism and irrealism" (p. 33), thus denying the epistemic status of this apparently transcendent law.

Many of us who have discussed these issues with philosophers will have been asked the question, in some form, "were there no conceptual schemes, would there still be stars in the galaxy?" It is an example raised in both 'Dividing the World in to Objects' by Andrew Cortens and in 'Pluralism, Metaphysical Realism, and Ultimate Reality' by Michael P. Lynch, with somewhat inconclusive results. The antirealist or idealist might be embarrassed to have to defend a position that seems to deny the very structure of the universe. But it seems to make perfect sense to acknowledge that we cognitively define the points of light in the night sky as stars without necessarily falling into a solipsistic black hole, especially if one stops to think about the sleight-of-hand built into the question itself. To refer to stars at all is already a conceptual act, but one should not assume that in naming things they actually conform in their entirety to what we imagine them to be. No doubt in the absence of human cognition the cosmic matter that gives rise to what we perceive as stars would not vanish. Nevertheless, it is to us alone that such cosmic matter is understood as stars. To put it another way, "were there no conceptual schemes, would there still be constellations in the galaxy?"

Elsewhere in the book the invocation of God becomes something of a theme, and checking through the Preface one realises that the anthology was given impetus by a seminar series in Christian scholarship at Calvin College, Michigan in 1999. In fact, the greater part of the essays deal with theological debates in one form or other, and in particular the metaphysical status of God. To judge from the blurb and the Cornell Web site, this is not something the publishers seem to want to highlight or even mention, presumably they have their own reasons for this. But given that anyone interested and intelligent enough to read the book will spot this theistic bias very quickly, it seems rather ungallant of Cornell not to openly declare the book's intentions.

Despite much philosophical square-bashing as we are sucked into in the often tedious detail of various arguments, the essays presented here are mostly well written and would, I suspect, serve to characterise the debate as it stands in certain intellectual circles. But I was left with a feeling of indifference, as though in the end the conflict between realism and antirealism simply cancels itself out. Indeed after reading it I was moved to adapt a question attributed to Ludwig Wittgenstein: "In what way would a world in which there was no mind-independent reality appear different from one in which there was?"

 

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